Should the host economy invest in a new industry? The roles of FDI spillovers, development level and heterogeneity of firms by Nguyen, Huu Thanh Tam & Pham, Ngoc-Sang
Should the host economy invest in a new industry? The
roles of FDI spillovers, development level and
heterogeneity of firms
Huu Thanh Tam Nguyen, Ngoc-Sang Pham
To cite this version:
Huu Thanh Tam Nguyen, Ngoc-Sang Pham. Should the host economy invest in a new industry?
The roles of FDI spillovers, development level and heterogeneity of firms. Documents de travail
du Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne 2014.86 - ISSN : 1955-611X. 2014. <halshs-01147485>
HAL Id: halshs-01147485
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-01147485
Submitted on 30 Apr 2015
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
 
 
 Documents de Travail du 
Centre d’Economie de la Sorbonne 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Should the host economy invest in a new industry? 
The roles of FDI spillovers, development level, 
and heterogeneity of firms 
 
Huu Thanh Tam NGUYEN, Ngoc-Sang PHAM 
 
2014.86 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Maison des Sciences Économiques, 106-112 boulevard de L'Hôpital, 75647  Paris Cedex 13 
http://centredeconomiesorbonne.univ-paris1.fr/ 
ISSN : 1955-611X 
Should the host economy invest in a new
industry? The roles of FDI spillovers,
development level, and heterogeneity of firms∗
Huu Thanh Tam Nguyen†and Ngoc-Sang Pham‡
October 7, 2014
Abstract
We consider a small open economy with two productive sectors
(an old and a new). There are two types of firms in the new indus-
try: a well planted multinational firm and a potential domestic firm.
Our framework highlights a number of results. First, in a poor country
with low return of training and weak FDI spillovers, the domestic firm
does not exist in the new industry requiring a high fixed cost. Second,
once the host economy has the capacity to create the new firm, the
productivity of the domestic firm is the key factor allowing it to enter
into the new industry, and even eliminate the multinational firm. In-
terestingly, in some cases where FDI spillovers are strong, the country
should invest in the new industry, but not train specific workers. Last,
credit constraints and labor/capital shares play important roles in the
competition between the multinational firm and the domestic one.
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21 Introduction
Over the last five decades, operations of multinational firms have made a
significant influence on developing economies. Multinational firms may gen-
erate FDI spillovers to domestic firms by transferring advanced technologies
or training workers. Thanks to that, some countries can promote the devel-
opment of new industries and particularly, encourage the entry of domestic
firms into these industries.1 However, is attracting FDI spillovers the key
factor for this development? If not, what is the optimal policy of the host
country? More precisely, should the host country develop these new indus-
tries, or continue to focus on already developed ones? How is the competition
between multinational and domestic firms? What are the roles of different
macroeconomic variables such as development level, FDI spillovers, return of
training, and heterogeneity of firms.
To answer these questions, we consider a small open economy model with
two sectors and heterogeneous firms. The first, called old sector, produces
consumption good. There is a unique representative domestic firm in this
sector. The second, called new sector, produces a new good by using phys-
ical capital and a specific labor. There are two types of firm in the new
sector: an already planted multinational firm and a potential domestic one.
The potential domestic firm cannot be created if it holds less than a critical
threshold L¯ units of specific labor. These two firms differ not only in pro-
ductivity but also in labor and capital shares. In this economy, consumption
good, physical capital, and new good can be freely exchanged with the rest
of the world while the specific labor is not mobile. The prices (in term of
consumption good) of physical capital and new good are assumed to be ex-
ogenous. However, the wage is endogenous and determined by labor market
clearing condition. Specific labor supply is also endogenous and arises from
three sources: initial specific labor of the country, FDI spillovers effects, and
investment in training.
Our framework provides a number of results. First, to invest in the new
industry, the country must hold one of the following conditions: (i) it is
rich enough, (ii) its return of training is high enough, (iii) FDI spillovers
are suffciently strong. This result is due to the existence of fixed cost L¯
which prevents the domestic firm’s entry. Our finding indicates that in a
poor country with low FDI spillovers, the domestic firm cannot exist in the
new industry even if its productivity is high.
Second, once the country holds the above conditions, the productivity of
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3the potential domestic firm is the key factor deciding the optimal choice of
the country.
Our framework shows that if the productivity of the foreign firm or of the
old sector is sufficiently high, the host country should not invest in the new
industry. Moreover, in the case where the multinational firm’s productivity
is high enough, the optimal strategy of the host country is to train specific
workers and then let them work for the foreign firm in order to get a favorable
salary.
We prove that the host country should invest in the new industry if and
only if the productivity of the domestic firm in this industry reaches a critical
threshold. Moreover, although the domestic firm must pay an entry cost, it
can dominate, even eliminate, the multinational firm. We also make clear
the role of the entry cost by showing that the mentioned critical threshold
of productivity increases when the entry cost increases. One may ask if
training of specific labor is essential to create a new domestic firm in the new
industry. Not always! Indeed, in the case where FDI spillovers are strong
and the domestic firm’s productivity is high, the host country should invest
in the new industry but not in training.
Third, we study the competition between the multinational firm and the
domestic one in the new industry by analyzing heterogeneities of firms and
the roles of exogenous prices, return of training. Since the wage is endoge-
nous, specific workers will be hired by the more competitive firms.2 Does
the domestic firm benefit from high return of training/low physical capital
price/high new good price in order to compete with the multinational firm?
Our model shows that, with high returns of training, the host country will
not invest in the new industry when the physical capital share of the po-
tential domestic firm is not too low. The main reason comes from credit
capacity of firms. Indeed, high returns implies a high number of specific
workers. If the potential domestic firm has a weak credit capacity, it cannot
buy an arbitrary quantity of physical capital when its capital share is not
too low and the number of workers is high. Therefore, its production process
will be inefficient. By contrast, the multinational firm can get financing from
its parent company and, thanks to that, when specific labor supply is high,
it can buy an arbitrary amount of physical capital to make its production
process efficient. As a consequence, all specific workers will be hired by the
multinational firm, which implies that the domestic one cannot enter the new
industry even if the country has a high return of training. A similar argu-
ment can be used when physical capital price is low. It seems that the host
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4country may more likely invest in the new industry if the new good price
is high. Unfortunately, this argument is not always true. Our framework
points out that even if the new good price is very high, the domestic firm
cannot enter this new industry because of its weak credit capacity. However,
we should make clear that with middle level of return of training/physical
capital price/new good price, productivities of firms play the most important
role in their competition.
Our paper is related to several strands of research. The first strand stud-
ies the fixed entry cost of firms and economic growth. Smith (1987) and
Markusen (1995) pointed out that a potential domestic firm has to invest in
a firm-specific fixed cost in order to be able to produce. By contrast, Smith
(1987) considered that the multinational firm has a plant in its home country
where this investment has been already realized, and then does not suffer it
by producing in the host country. Fosfuri, Motta, Ronde (2001) indicated
that a domestic firm may gain from new technologies thanks to the mobility
of worker who initially worked for multinational firms. However, to do that,
the domestic firm must to pay a fixed cost which may be interpreted as its
absorptive capability. In our framework, we assume that the domestic firm
must utilize a fixed number of skilled workers to ensure that its production
process functions. We also make clear the impact of this fixed cost on the
competition of firms, and then on the economic growth. In optimal growth
context, Bruno, Le Van, Masquin (2009) proved that a poor country cannot
invest in new technology. However, they consider do not take into account
the impact of multinational firms. In our paper, multinational firms can gen-
erate FDI spillovers and may eventually help the country to invest in new
technology.
The second concerns FDI spillovers and training of skilled workers. The
literature shows the existence of four types of FDI spillovers.3 First, FDI
spillovers may be created via vertical linkages between foreign affiliates and
local suppliers (Rodriguez-Clare , 1996; Markusen, Venables , 1995; Carluc-
cio, Fally , 2013). Second, multinational firms can improve productivity of
domestic firms through demonstration/imitation effects. Export is the third
channel through which domestic firms can benefit from multinational firms
(Aitken, Hanson, Harrison , 1997; Greenaway, Sousab, Wakelin , 2004). Last,
FDI spillovers may arise due to the mobility of workers who have been trained
by multinational firms (Ethier, Markusen , 1996; Fosfuri, Motta, Ronde ,
2001; Poole , 2013). FDI spillovers in our paper are generated through the
last form. By contrast, in our paper, specific workers are not only trained
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5by multinational firms (through specific communication or learning by doing
effects), but also by the government; thanks to that, the host country gaining
low FDI spillovers can still develop the new industry.
The last strand is the link between credit constraints and trade. Kletzer,
Bardhan (1987) theoretically showed how comparative advantage depends
on credit market imperfections. By using a 30-year panel for 65 countries,
Beck (2002) found that financial development exerts a causal impact on
exports and trade balance of manufactured goods. Manova (2008) studied
the impact of equity market liberalizations on trade by giving empirical ev-
idence (with 91 countries), and then showed that credit constraints play an
important role on international trade flows. Manova (2013) incorporated
credit constraints and firm heterogeneity into Melitz (2003) and studied the
impact of financial frictions not only on producers’s entry into exporting but
also on exporters’ foreign sales. Different from theses papers, we focus on the
impact of credit constraints on the competition between the domestic firm
and the multinational one in the host country’s market.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents
the structure of economy. In section 3, we explore the optimal strategy of
the host country at equilibrium in a two-period model by analyzing roles of
all factors of the economy. Section 4 concludes. All formal proofs can be
found in Appendices.
2 The model
We consider a small open economy having two productive sectors. The first
produces the consumption good by using physical capital good. We call
it the old sector. There is a unique representative domestic firm (called
consumption good firm) in this sector and its production function is given
by
F c(Kc) = AcK
αc
c (1)
where Ac > 0 and αc ∈ (0, 1).4
The second sector produces a new good by using physical capital good
and a specific labor. It is called new sector or new industry. In this sector,
there are two types of firm: a multinational firm (or foreign firm) and a
potential domestic one. The foreign firm is well planted in the country and
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6its production function is
F e(Ke, Le) = AeK
αe
e L
βe
e (2)
where Ae > 0 and αe, βe ∈ (0, 1), αe + βe ≤ 1.
The potential domestic firm’s production function is given by
F d(Kd, Ld) = AdK
αd
d
(
(Ld − L¯)+
)βd (3)
where Ad > 0 and αd, βd ∈ (0, 1), αd+βd ≤ 1.5 To enter the new industry, the
domestic firm must make an initial investment. We model this investment
by the fixed cost, L¯, representing the number of specific workers needed to
ensure that the production process functions. Thanks to the parent company,
the foreign firm does not need to pay this investment.
Interpretation of L¯: In general, we can assume that the production
functions of firms are
F d(Kd, Ld) = AdK
αd
d
(
(Ld − L¯d)+
)βd
F e(Ke, Le) = AeK
αe
e
(
(Ld − L¯e)+
)βe
.
In the new industry, firms need some technical experts to set up the pro-
duction process in order to be able to produce. The parent company of the
foreign firm has such experts in the home country and sends them to host
countries for new production plants. Once this setup is finished, the technical
experts will come back to their home country. Hence, we can assume that
L¯d > L¯e. Without loss of generality, we assume that L¯e = 0, and in this case
we write L¯ instead of L¯d.
6
In our framework, the economy takes place into two periods: date 0 and
date 1. All consumption good, physical capital, and new good can be freely
exchanged with the rest of the world, but the specific labor is not mobile. Let
consumption good price be numeraire. Denote p (resp., pn) the international
real prices of capital good (resp., new good) in term of consumption good.
Prices p, pn are exogenous. The initial endowment of the host country is S,
(S > 0.)
Let L0 be the initial specific labor, T0 be the specific workers generated by
the foreign firm at the first period.7 We assume that if the country invests an
amount H1 in training of specific labor, it will get H1 specific workers, where
 is the return of training. Hence the specific labor supply of the country
after receiving FDI and training will be
L0 + T0 + H1.
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7Note that specific labor supply in this economy is endogenous.
Let denote this economy by
E := (F c, F d, F e, S, p, pn, , L0, T0, L¯).
Denote by w1 the real wage in term of consumption good at date 1,
the wage is endogenous in our model. For simplicity, we assume that the
depreciation rate of physical capital equal 1.
The foreign firm (without market power) maximizes its profit.
(F ) : max
Ke,1,LDe,1≥0
[
pnF
e(Ke,1, L
D
e,1)− pKe,1 − w1LDe,1
]
.
The social planner takes prices as given and chooses c1, Kc,1, Kd,1, H1, Ld,1, Le,1
to maximize GNP of the economy at the second period:8
(P ) : max(
Kc,1,Kd,1,H1,Ld,1,Le,1
) [U := F c(Kc,1) + w1Le,1 + pnF d(Kd,1, Ld,1)]
subject to
H1 + p(Kc,1 +Kd,1) ≤ S (4)
Ld,1 + Le,1 ≤ L0 + T0 + H1, (5)
Kc,1, Kd,1, H1, Ld,1, Le,1 ≥ 0. (6)
At the first period (date 0), the social planner uses H1 units of consump-
tion good to train specific labor. She also buys Kc,1, (resp. Kd,1) units of
physical capital as input for the consumption sector (resp. the new sector).
At the second period (date 1), an amount of specific labor Le,1 is used by
the multinational firm and another amount of specific labor Ld,1 is used by
the domestic firm. The GNP of the economy (in term of consumption good)
has three parts
(i) F c(Kc,1): consumption good from the consumption sector.
(ii) w1Le,1: salary in term of consumption good paid by the multinational
firm.
(iii) pnF
d(Kd,1, Ld,1): production value of the domestic firm.
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8Note that, if a specific worker works for the multinational firm, she only
contributes to the GNP by her salary because the multinational firm takes
away its profits. However, if she works for the domestic firm, the GNP is
improved in two ways, salary of the worker and profit of the domestic firm.
Remark 1. The constraint H1 + p(Kc,1 + Kd,1) ≤ S means that the host
country cannot borrow from abroad. As a consequence, the potential domestic
firm faces a credit constraint. By contrast, the multinational firm does not
face credit constraint because it can get financing from its parent company.
2.1 Equilibrium
Definition 1. Consider the economy E := (F c, F d, F e, S, p, pn, , L0, T0, L¯).
An equilibrium is a list (Kc,1, Kd,1, H1, Ld,1, Le,1, Ke,1, w1) such that
(i) Given labor price w1, (Kc,1, Kd,1, H1, Ld,1, Le,1) is a solution of problem
(P ).
(ii) Given labor price w1, (L
D
e,1, Ke,1) is a solution of problem (F ).
(iii) Labor market clears: LDe,1 = Le,1.
The wage is endogenously determined by the labor market clearing con-
dition LDe,1 = Le,1. Note that, in general, it is impossible to give a closed
formula of the wage.
The production function F d is not differentiable at (K, L¯) because of
the existence of entry cost L¯ > 0. We solve (P ) by considering two cases:
Ld,1 > L¯ and Ld,1 ≤ L¯, and compute the GNP in each case. We then compare
these GNPs and find conditions under which the one is greater than the other.
In what follows, in order to avoid confusion, we present our findings in
the case where the production functions of the firms are strictly decreasing
returns to scale (DRS), i.e. αd + βd, αe + βe < 1. Note that, most of our
findings are also valid for constant returns to scale technologies (see Theorem
2 and Proposition 10).
As the wage is endogenous in our model, let us start by pointing out
relations among exogenous prices, return of training and wage.
Proposition 1. (i) w1 decreases if p or  increases, increases if pn in-
creases.
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9(ii) Denote w˜1 (resp. wˆ1) the wage in the case Yd,1 > 0 (resp. Yd,1 = 0).
Then we have wˆ1 ≤ w˜1.
Proof. These are direct consequences of the equation determining the wage,
which is presented in Appendix 5 .
Point (i) is clear. For example, a rising of physical capital price do de-
crease the production level in the new sector. Consequently, demand of
specific labor decreases. Therefore, the wage will decrease.
Point (ii) of Proposition 1 indicates that the entry of domestic firm into
the new industry leads to a greater wage than that in the case without the
domestic firm.
2.2 FDI spillovers, optimal shares, and GNP
In this section, we consider an equilibrium in which H1 > 0. Denote θh, θd
the optimal share of investment in training and in new sectors, respectively,
i.e.,
pKc,1 = (1− θd − θh)S, pKd,1 = θdS and H1 = θhS (7)
First, we focus on direct FDI spillovers T0.
Proposition 2. When T0 increases, GNP increases, but θh decreases.
Proof. See Appendix 5.3.
This result confirms the positive impact of direct FDI spillovers T0 on
GNP of the host country, as it is shown in the literature. However, such
positive externalities lowers the share of investment in training of specific
labor. The reason is that an increase of T0 will improve the specific workers
supply in the host country, then lower wage, finally decrease investment in
training.
3 Should the host economy invest in a new
industry?
We says that the country invests in the new industry if Yd,1 > 0. In this
section, we now study the roles of different factors on the optimal strategy
of the social planner. Let us start by two extreme cases: the entry cost L¯ is
very low and the initial endowment S is very high.
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Proposition 3. (i) There exists L¯∗ > 0 such that if L¯ < L¯∗ then Yd,1 > 0.
(ii) There exists S¯ such that if S > S¯ then H1 > 0 and Yd,1 > 0 at equilib-
rium.
Proof. See Appendix 5.3.
In our model, the country’s initial endowment S can be viewed as an index
of the development level of the country. Proposition 3 shows that, when the
country has a high development level (i.e, S reaches a critical level), or the
entry cost is very small, the host country should invest in the new industry.
3.1 Role of productivities
We now observe the impact of the productivities of the old sector and the
multinational firm as well.
Proposition 4. (i) There exists A¯e > 0 such that if Ae ≥ A¯e, we have
Yd,1 = 0 and H1 > 0.
(ii) There exists A¯c > 0 such that if Ac ≥ A¯c, we have Yd,1 = 0 and H1 = 0.
Proof. See Appendix 5.3.
Proposition 4 shows that, if the productivity of the foreign firm or of the
old sector is so high, the host country should not invest in the new industry.
Moreover, in the first case, it is optimal to train specific workers and then
let them work for the foreign firm in order to get a favorable salary. By
contrast, in the second case when the old sector is highly competitive, the
country should not invest in training of specific workers. Indeed, the goal of
this investment is to provide specific labor for the new sector. However, the
competitiveness of this sector is less than that of the old sector, and then so
is the gain from the new sector. As a consequence, investing in training is
not the best choice.
We now study how the productivity of the domestic firm and the devel-
opment level of the host country affect the optimal strategy of the social
planner. Let us begin by the following result.
Proposition 5. If S + L0 + T0 ≤ L¯ then Yd,1 = 0.
Proof. Since H1 ≤ S then L0 + T0 + H1 ≤ S + L0 + T0. Consequently,
Ld,1 − L¯ ≤ 0, hence Ld,1 = Kd,1 = 0.
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Proposition 5 shows that if a country want to invest in the new industry,
it must hold one of the following conditions: (i) its development level is high
enough, (ii) the return of training is high enough, (iii) FDI spillovers are
strong enough.
We now consider a host country whose maximum specific labor supply is
greater than the entry cost but specific labor supply without training is not.
We have the following result.
Proposition 6. Assume that S + L0 + T0 > L¯ ≥ L0 + T0. We have
(i) there exists A¯1 > 0 such that Yd,1(Ad) > 0 if and only if Ad ≥ A¯d. In
this case H1 > 0.
(ii) there exists A˜1 ≥ A¯1 such that if Ad > A˜1 then Yd,1 > Ye,1.
(iii) both A¯1 and A˜1 are increasing in L¯.
Proof. See Appendix 5.3
Point (i) of Proposition 6 indicates that, in a host country such as the
one studied in this case, the productivity of the domestic firm is the key
factor determining the optimal strategy of the social planner. If this firm is
sufficiently competitive, it is optimal to invest in the new sector. However,
since L0 + T0 ≤ L¯, training of specific workers is required to cover the entry
cost of the domestic firm. That is why we have a strictly positive amount H1
when Ad is high enough. Inversely, if the domestic firm has a low productivity,
the social planner should not invest in the new industry. In this case, we do
not have enough information to know whether the country invests in training
of specific labor.
Point (ii) of Proposition 6 shows that the domestic firm can even dominate
the foreign one, when the productivity of the former is very high, Ad > A˜1 .
Our result is related to Markusen, Venables (1995) since these authors proved
that in some countries, domestic firms may become sufficiently strong such
that local production overtakes and carries out foreign one.
In point (iii) of Proposition 6, we clearly see how the fixed cost L¯ prevent
the host country invests in the new industry. The higher level of L¯, the higher
level of productivity the domestic firm must have to enter the market.
Let us show an example. Denote U˜ (resp. Uˆ) the GNP in the case Yd,1 > 0
(resp. Yd,1 = 0). Figure 1 gives the path of the difference U˜− Uˆ as a function
of Ad for three values of L¯ = 1, 2, 3. Note that Ad > Ae (or Ad < Ae) is not
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sufficient to ensure the domestic firm’s entry. We also see that the threshold
A¯1 is increasing in L¯.
Figure 1: The graph of (U˜ − Uˆ) as a function of Ad
Ac = Ae = 1.2;  = 1.2;S = 2;L0 = 0.5;T0 = 0.5; p = 1; pn = 2;
αc = 0.7;αd = 0.3; βd = 0.4;αe = 1/3; βe = 7/15.
We have a direct consequence of Proposition 6.
Corollary 1. Assume that L0 = T0 = 0 and S > L¯. We have Yd,1, H1 > 0
when Ad is high enough.
This is the case where there is neither FDI spillovers effects nor initial
specific labor. Our result gives an answer for the question: when the host
country create a new industry? A new industry can only be created under
two conditions: (1) return of training is high, (2) the potential domestic firm
is competitive enough.
We now study the case of a host country in which specific labor supply
without training is high enough.
L0 + T0 > L¯ (8)
The optimal strategy of the social planner depends on different factors.
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Proposition 7. Assume that L0 + T0 > L¯.
(i) If S < αd
βd
(L0 +T0− L¯) then there exists A¯2 > 0 such that Yd,1 > 0 and
H1 = 0 if and only if Ad ≥ A¯2. Moreover, there exists A˜2 ≥ A¯2 such
that if Ad > A˜2 then Yd,1 > Ye,1.
(ii) If S > αd
βd
(L0 +T0− L¯) then there exists A¯3 > 0 such that Yd,1 > 0 and
H1 > 0 if and only if Ad ≥ A¯3. Moreover, there exists A˜3 ≥ A¯3 such
that if Ad > A˜3 then Yd,1 > Ye,1.
(iii) If S = αd
βd
(L0+T0−L¯) then when Ad is high enough, we have Yd,1 > 0.9
Proof. See Appendix 5.3.
Proposition 7 indicates that sole conditions on specific labor and entry
cost are not sufficient to ensure the entry of the domestic firm into the new
industry. Once again, we observe the decisive role of its productivity Ad. The
host country should invest in the new industry if and only if this productivity
is high enough. This explains why in some rich countries, although there are
sufficiently workers required to create a new industry, they do not choose to
do it.
The first point of Proposition 7 shows us an interesting scenario: the host
country can create a new firm, i.e. Yd,1 > 0, without training of specific labor,
i.e., H1 = 0. This is the case where the potential domestic firm’s productivity
is high and the condition S < αd
βd
(L0 + T0 − L¯) holds, i.e., when
(i)  is low (see Proposition 8 for further discussions.)
(ii) or/and the ratio αd/βd of capital share over specific labor share of the
potential domestic firm is high
(iii) or/and the difference L0 + T0 − L¯ is high. This means that the entry
cost is relatively lower than FDI spillovers T0 and/or the initial specific
labor L0.
Some empirical studies are likely to support our finding. Gershenberg
(1987) argued that in Kenya, some local managers usually started their career
in multinational firms before creating their own firm. By using a sample
of firm-level data in Ghana, Gorg, Strobl (2005) stated that there exist
some domestic firms whose entrepreneurs (owner or chairman) worked for
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a multinational firm before joining or setting up their own domestic firm.10
These managers/entrepreneurs can be represented by parameter T0 in our
model.
We summarize our findings in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. We have the following properties at equilibrium
1. If L0 + S + T0 ≤ L¯ then Yd,1(Ad) = 0 for all Ad.
2. If L0 + S + T0 > L¯ then
2.1. If L0 +T0 ≤ L¯ then when Ad is high enough, we have Yd,1 > 0 and
H1 > 0. Moreover, when Ad is very high, we have Yd,1 > Ye,1.
2.2. If L0 + T0 > L¯ then
2.2.1. if S < αd
βd
(L0 +T0− L¯) then when Ad is high enough, we have
Yd,1 > 0 and H1 = 0. Moreover, when Ad is very high, we
have Yd,1 > Ye,1.
2.2.2 if S > αd
βd
(L0 +T0− L¯) then when Ad is high enough, we have
Yd,1 > 0 and H1 > 0. Moreover, when Ad is very high, we
have Yd,1 > Ye,1.
2.2.3 If S = αd
βd
(L0 +T0− L¯) then when Ad is high enough, we have
Yd,1 > 0.
In Theorem 1, the multinational firm produces thanks to its decreasing
return to scale technology. However, in the case of constant return to scale
production functions, we have the following result.
Theorem 2. We assume that αd + βd = αe + βe = 1. We have the following
properties at equilibrium
1. If L0 + S + T0 ≤ L¯ then Yd,1 = 0, Ye,1 > 0.
2. If L0 + S + T0 > L¯ then
2.1. If L0 +T0 ≤ L¯ then when Ad is high enough, we have Yd,1, H1 > 0,
and Ye,1 = 0.
2.2. If L0 + T0 > L¯ then
2.2.1. if S ≤ αd
1−αd (L0 + T0 − L¯) then when Ad is high enough, we
have Yd,1 > 0, H1 = 0 and Ye,1 = 0.
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2.2.2 if S > αd
1−αd (L0 + T0 − L¯) then when Ad is high enough, we
have Yd,1, H1 > 0, and Ye,1 = 0.
Proof. See Appendix 6.
On the one hand, Theorem 2 shares the main point with Theorem 1. On
the other hand, it indicates an interesting scenario in which the well planted
foreign firm may be eliminated. There are two main conditions for such
scenario: (i) the maximum specific labor supply is high enough to cover the
entry cost, (ii) the domestic firm’s productivity is high. In this scenario,
although the domestic firm has to pay an entry cost, it may not only enter
into the new industry but also eliminate the well planted multinational firm.
3.2 Roles of return of training and credit constraints
We are now interested in the role of return of training of qualified workers
on the optimal strategy of the country.
Proposition 8. Then there exists ¯,  depending on the other parameters such
that: (i) if  > ¯ then H1() > 0 at equilibrium, (ii)  <  then H1() = 0.
Proof. See Appendix 5.3.
Proposition 8 shows that the host country will invest in training of specific
labor if its return exceeds a threshold. But if return of training is low, the
country should not invest in this sector.
A natural question is that when return  is very high, will investing in the
new industry be optimal for the host country? The answer is the following:
Proposition 9. (High return of training with DRS technologies)
(i) If βe
1−αe < 1− αd then when  is high enough, the country should invest
in both training and the new industry.
(ii) if βe
1−αe > 1− αd then when  is high enough, the country should invest
in training, but not invest in the new industry.
Proof. See Appendix 5.3.
With constant return to scale (CRS) technologies, we have.
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Proposition 10. (High return of training with CRS technologies).
Assume that αd + βd = αe + βe = 1. When  is high enough, the country
should invest in training, but not invest in the new industry.
Proof. See Appendix 6.
Proposition 10 can be viewed as a consequence of point (ii.b) of Propo-
sition 9. Indeed, let αe + βe tend to 1, then
βe
1−αe tends to 1 which is greater
that 1 − αd. According to point (ii.b) of Proposition 9, H1 > 0, Yd,1 = 0
when return of training  is high enough. Although CRS technologies would
simplify computations, it may make a misunderstanding about the optimal
strategy of the country. We can see here that if we only considered CRS
technologies, we could not know the roles of labor/capital shares. That is
why we need to analyze both cases, particularly the DRS technology case.
We now can give some implications of Propositions 9 and 10 by consid-
ering a country in which specific labor can be easily trained (i.e.,  is high).
First, as stated in Proposition 9, this country should focus on the new
industry if the potential domestic firm has a high labor share. Indeed, on the
one hand, high value of  allows the domestic firm to cover more easily the
entry cost L¯. On the other hand, high labor share of the domestic firm make
it be more competitive than the foreign firm. Consequently, the country
should invest in the new industry.
Second, we discuss credit constraints of firms. We recall the budget
constraint of the social planner
H1 + p(Kc,1 +Kd,1) ≤ S.
We see that the host country cannot borrow from abroad. Therefore the
potential domestic firm faces a credit constraint pKd,1 < S, i.e., Kd,1 <
K¯ := S/p. Therefore, if capital share reaches a critical threshold, αd >
1−αe−βe
1−αe , the production process will be inefficient when the number of workers
is high. However, since the multinational firm can get financing from the
parent company, it is not credit constrained. Hence it can buy arbitrary high
quantity of input Ke,1 to be consistent with high quantity of specific labor.
Therefore, in the environment of the multinational firm, specific workers have
enough physical capital in order to produce efficiently the new good. As a
consequence, when return  is high, all specific workers will be hired by the
multinational firm even if the domestic firm has higher productivity.11 It
means that credit constraints may prevent the domestic firm to entry in the
new industry.
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By analyzing the impact of credit constraints on the competition between
the domestic firm and the multinational one, our result contributes to the
literature about the impact of credit constraints on international trade (Klet-
zer, Bardhan , 1987; Beck , 2002; Alfaro, Chanda, Kalemli-Ozcan, Sayek ,
2004; Manova , 2008, 2013).
We note that in the case βe
1−αe = 1− αd, when  is high, we must to have
information of other factors, specially Ad, Ae, to know the optimal strategy
of the country. Figure 2 gives us the answer. We also consider 2 cases:
3 = Ad > Ae = 1 and 1 = Ad < Ae = 3. Figure 2 indicates that, when  is
Figure 2: The graph of (U˜ − Uˆ) as a function of  with βe
1−αe = 1− αd
Ac = 1;S = 1;L0 = 2;T0 = 1; L¯ = 1; p = 1; pn = 2
αc = αd + βd = 0.7;αe = 1/3; βe = 7/15
high enough, the host country will invest in the new industry (U˜ − Uˆ > 0) if
the productivity of the domestic firm is high (3 = Ad > Ae = 1 ). Conversely,
such investment will not be done if this productivity is low (1 = Ad < Ae =
3). This result is totally consistent with Theorem 1.
3.3 Roles of exogenous prices
In this section, we focus on the role of physical capital and new good prices.
We analyze two cases, new good price pn is high and physical capital price p
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is low. First, we study what happens when new good price pn is very high.
Proposition 11. We have lim
pn→+∞
w1(pn)
pn
= +∞. When pn is high enough,
the host country invests in training, but not in the new industry.
Proof. See Appendix 5.3.
Proposition 11 shows that when new good price is very high, the host
country should invest in training, but not in the new industry, whatever
the productivity of the domestic firm. The main reason is the following.
When price pn of new good increases, wage w1 consequently increases. This
encourages the host country to invest in training. Moreover, since wage
increases faster than new good price and it must to pay an entry cost to
invest in the new industry, it will be optimal to let all specific workers work
for the foreign firm in order to get a favorable salary.
Let us give an example where the domestic firm’s productivity is greater
than that of the multinational firm (cf. Figure 3).
Figure 3: The graph of (U˜ − Uˆ) as a function of pn
 = 1.2;S = 1;L0 = 2;T0 = 1; L¯ = 1; p = 1;
Ac = 1.2;αc = 0.7;αd = 0.3; βd = 0.4;αe = 1/3; βe = 7/15;
2 = Ad > Ae = 1.2
When pn is high enough, we see that U˜ < Uˆ , i.e., the country should
not invest in the new industry even Ad > Ae. Note that when pn is low
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or medium, we need more informations of other factors in order to confirm
U˜ < Uˆ .
Second, we consider the case where physical capital price p is low. In this
case, capital shares play an important role.
Proposition 12. (i) Assume that αe
1−αe > max(αc, αd). The host country
will invest in training, but not in the new industry when p is low enough.
(ii) Assume that αd > max(αc,
αe
1−αe ), S + L0 + T0 > L¯
(ii.a) If S > αd
βd
(L0+T0−L¯), the host country will invest both in training
and in the new industry when p is low enough.
(iii.b) If S < αd
βd
(L0 + T0 − L¯), the host country will invest in the new
industry, but not in training when p is low enough.12
Proof. See Appendix 5.3.
The reason for point (i) in Proposition 12 is similar to that of Proposition
11. Indeed, when p decreases, demand for specific labor increases and so is
wage w1. This incites the host country to invest in training. High capital
share of the foreign firm makes it to be more competitive than the domestic
firm. Therefore, the host country will not invest in the new industry. In this
case, all specific workers work for the multinational firm.
One may ask why there are two possibilities in Proposition 12, but there
is a unique in Proposition 11. The reason is from the fact that new good
price pn does not enter in the budget constraint of the social planner while
physical capital price p makes influence not only in the new industry, but
also in the old industry.
We now explore some implications of point (ii) of Proposition 12.
(a) First, as in point (i), if the domestic firm’s capital share is high, the
host country invests in the new sector when physical capital price is
low.
(b) Second, when physical capital price p is low, the country also invests in
training if one of the following conditions holds: (1) return of training
 is high, (2) the ratio βd/αd of specific labor share over capital share
of the potential domestic firm is high, (3) the difference L0 + T0 − L¯ is
low.
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Let us end this section by considering a specific case where we can give
explicit conditions under which the host country invests in training of specific
labor and in the new industry.
Example 1. We assume that
αc
1− αc =
βe
1− αe − βe =
αd + βd
1− αd − βd . (9)
(i) There exists an equilibrium with H1 > 0 and Yd,1 > 0 if and only if the
two following conditions hold
S + L0 + T0 ≥ L¯
1− Ω (10)
S(σc + σd + σe) > (S + L0 + T0 − L¯)(σc + αd
αd + βd
σd), (11)
where Ω :=
α(γc + γd) + γe
αγc + γe
( γc + γe
γc + γe + γd
) 1
α
< 1, with α := αc =
αd + βd and
σc := αcγc, σd := (αd + βd)γd, σe := γe (12)
γc := α
αc
1−αc
c A
1
1−αc
c
(
p
) −αc
1−αc (13)
γd := α
αd
1−αd−βd
d β
βd
1−αd−βd
d
(
Adpn
) 1
1−αd−βd
(
p
) −αd
1−αd−βd (14)
γe := α
αe
1−αe−βe
e β
1−αe
1−αe−βe
e
(
Aepn
) 1
1−αe−βe p
−αe
1−αe−βe . (15)
(ii) There exists an equilibrium with H1 > 0 and Yd,1 = 0 if and only if the
two following conditions hold
S + L0 + T0 <
L¯
1− Ω (16)
Sγe > αcγc(L0 + T0). (17)
Proof. See Appendix 5.3.
In point (i), condition (10) is to ensure that the GNP in case Yd,1 > 0
is greater than the GNP in case Yd,1 = 0. H1 > 0 is ensured by Condition
(11). In point (ii), condition (16) is to ensure that the GNP in case Yd,1 > 0
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is smaller than the GNP in case Yd,1 = 0, H1 > 0 is ensured by Condition
(17).
Example 1 shows the complexity of solution and indicates that the opti-
mal strategy of the host country depends on all parameters of the economy.
However, with the assumption in Equation (9), the example cannot illustrate
all our results in previous section.
4 Conclusion
We have constructed a two-period small open economy model with multi-
sector, heterogeneous firms, and then used it to study the optimal strategy
of a country and analyze roles of all factors of the economy. Our finding
indicates that the country’s optimal strategy depends on its development
level.
First, poor countries with low FDI spillovers cannot invest in a new in-
dustry that requires a high entry cost. In this case, all specific workers in
this sector will work for multinational firms.
Second, the FDI spillovers can improve the GNP and help poor or devel-
oping countries to create a new firm, but it does decrease the optimal share
of high-qualified labor. We proved that if FDI spillovers are high, these coun-
try may create a new firm without training of qualified workers. But if FDI
spillovers are not high, these countries must train qualified workers in order
to invest in this new industry.
Third, our model shows that once the host country has a sufficient high-
skilled labor to cover the fixed cost in the new industry, the efficiency of
domestic firm is necessary and sufficient to ensure its entry. This explains
why developed countries do not invest in some new industries.
The competition between the multinational and the domestic firms de-
pends on many factors. The most important factors are their productivities
Ad, Ae. However, credit constraint also plays an important role. Because of
credit constraint, the domestic firm may be eliminated even if it has a higher
productivity.
Notes
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1See Harrison, Rodriguez-Clare (2010) for a complete review.
2In our model, the competitiveness of firm is characterized by four factors: productivity,
labor and capital share, and credit capacity.
3See Blomstrom, Kokko (1998); Gorg, Greenaway (2004); Crespo, Fontoura (2007)
for a substantial review of FDI spillovers.
4The reader may ask why there is only one input to produce consumption good. We
can introduce labor into the production process of the consumption good by taking the
production function as F c(Kc, Lc) = AcK
αc
c L
βc
c where Lc is low-skilled labor. If we assume
that low-skilled labor is exogenous and there is no possible transfer between high-skilled
and low-skilled workers, this setup becomes exactly our framework with the unique input.
5Here, we define X+ = 0 if X < 0, and X+ = X if X ≥ 0.
6We would like to make distinction between our threshold L¯ and others in literature.
Azariadis, Drazen (1990) considered the following production function F = AtF (Kt, Lt),
where the scale factor At may depend functionally on a vector of social inputs that are
not controlled by any one producer.
In Bruno, Le Van, Masquin (2009), At is endogenized: the social planner chooses
physical capital Ke,t and high-skilled labor Le,t in order to produce new technology, which
enter the formula of At as follows At := x0 +a(F (Ke,t, Le,t)− X¯)+. X¯ a minimum level of
adoption of new technologies which is necessary for them in order to impact the economy.
In Smith (1987), the potential domestic firm has the following problem
maxP (X)X − cost(X)− (fixed cost). (18)
In Melitz (2003), the production function is given by F (L) = φ(L− f)+. The threshold
f > 0 represents a fixed entry cost (measured in units of labor.
In Fosfuri, Motta, Ronde (2001), fixed cost arises in the local firm’s valuation of the
worker vl = N2Πd(φ)− k where k indicates the cost that local firm has to pay in order to
gain from new technology received by the trained worker.
7We note that FDI spillovers T0 in our framework arise through workers mobility. We
refer to Fosfuri, Motta, Ronde (2001); Gorg, Strobl (2005); Poole (2013) for the existence
of such FDI spillovers.
8In general, the social planner’ problem is to choose c0, c1, S,Kc,1,Kd,1, H1, Ld,1, Le,1
that maximizes the utility
max(
c0,c1,S,Kc,1,Kd,1,H1,Ld,1,Le,1
)[β0U(c0) + β1U(c1)]
subject to c0 + S ≤ S0, c1 ≤ F (S)
where S0 > 0 is given, βi is the time preference at date i = 0, 1, and F (S) is defined by
max
[
F c(Kc,1) + w1Le,1 + pnF
d(Kd,1, Ld,1)
]
(19)
subject to H1 + p(Kc,1 +Kd,1) ≤ S (20)
Ld,1 + Le,1 ≤ L0 + T0 + H1 (21)
Kc,1,Kd,1, H1, Ld,1, Le,1 ≥ 0. (22)
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For simplicity, we assume that saving S is exogenous. Then the problem of the social
planner is equivalent to the problem (P).
9S = αdβd (L0 + T0 − L¯). We do not enough information to confirm H1 > 0. It depends
on other factors. We will answer this question in Section 1.
10Among 228 domestic firms in the sample, the number of domestic firms whose the
entrepreneur worked for a multinational firm is about 32. Most of them is in metals and
machinery (34.4%), followed by furniture (31.3%), textiles (18.8%), and wood products
(9.4%).
11Indeed, consider the case CRS technologies with Ad > Ae, αd = αe, βd = βe, and there
is no entry cost (L¯ = 0). Proposition 10 proves that Ld,1 = 0 when  is high enough.
12We note that in the case where αc > max(αd,
αe
1−αe ), we do not know if the country
invest in the new industry. Because, this condition does not make a strong influence on
the competition between firms in the new industry.
5 Appendix: Decreasing return to scale
In this Section, we prove our finding with DRS technologies. The proofs of
results with CRS technologies can be found in Section 6.
We assume that αd + βd, αe + βe < 1. In Sections 5.1 and 5.2, we will
characterize equilibrium. We then present formal proofs of our results with
DRS technologies in Section 5.3.
At equilibrium, since the production functions of the foreign firm and the
consumption good producer are decreasing return to scale, we always have
Kc,1, Ke,1, Le,1 > 0.
We now write first order conditions (FOCs) for the foreign firm.
Le,1 : pnβeAeK
αd
e,1L
βe−1
e,1 = w1
Ke,1 : pnαeAeK
αe−1
e,1 L
βe
e,1 = p.
Therefore, we get that
Ke,1 =
αe
βe
w1
p
Le,1, Le,1 = σew
−(1−αe)
1−αe−βe
1 ,
where σe := α
αe
1−αe−βe
e β
1−αe
1−αe−βe
e
(
Aepn
) 1
1−αe−βe p
−αe
1−αe−βe
Denote λ, µ Lagrange multipliers associated to conditions (4), (5), respec-
tively, and λh is Lagrange multiplier with respect to condition H1 ≥ 0. We
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write FOCs for the social planner for variables Kc,1, H1, Le,1
Kc,1 : αcAcK
αc−1
c,1 = λp
Le,1 : w1 − µ = 0
H1 : −λ+ µ+ λh = 0, where λh ≥ 0, H1λh = 0.
Note that to solve social planner’s optimization problem, we must consider
two cases: Yd,1 = 0 and Yd,1 > 0. Then, we compare welfares in these cases
in order to know what is the optimal strategy.
5.1 Equilibrium with H1 = 0
(i): If L0 + T0 ≤ L¯. We have Le,1 + Ld,1 ≤ H1 + L0 + T0 = L0 + T0 ≤ L¯,
thus Ld,1 ≤ L¯ then Yd,1 = 0.
(ii): If L0 + T0 > L¯. We have to consider two cases: Yd,1 = 0 and Yd,1 > 0.
Case 1: Yd,1 = 0. In this case Kd,1 = Ld,1 = 0. Therefore, we get that
Kc,1 =
S
p
and Le,1 = L0 + T0. By using FOCs of firm’s maximization, we
have Le,1 = σew
−(1−αe)
1−αe−βe
1 . Hence, wage is computed by
w1 =
( σe
L0 + T0
) 1−αe−βe
1−αe . (23)
In this case, we have
Welfare = Ac(
S
p
)αc + βeα
αe
1−αe
e A
1
1−αe
e
( pn
pαe
) 1
1−αe (L0 + T0)
βe
1−αe .
Note that we have to justify the following condition
FOC of H1 : pw1 ≤ λp = αcAcKαc−1c,1 .
This condition is equivalent to the following condition under which  is low
enough.
S1−αcβeα
αe
1−αe
e A
1
1−αe
e p
αc
( pn
pαe
) 1
1−αe ≤ αcAc
(
L0 + T0
) 1−αe−β−e
1−αe . (24)
Case 2: Yd,1 > 0. In this case Ld,1 > L¯. We write FOCs for the social
planner
Kd,1 : pnαdAdK
αd−1
d,1 (Ld,1 − L¯)βd − λp = 0
Ld,1 : pnβdAdK
αd
d,1(Ld,1 − L¯)βd−1 − µ = 0
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Since we are considering the case H1 = 0, labor market clearing condition
implies that Ld,1 = L0 + T0 − Le,1 = L0 + T0 − σew
−(1−αe)
1−αe−βe
1 .
By using FOC for variable Ld,1, we get thatKd,1 =
( w1
βdpnAd
) 1
αd
(
Ld,1−L¯
) 1−βd
αd .
On the other hand, we have αcAcK
αc−1
c,1 = λp = αdpnAdK
αd−1
d1
(Ld,1 − L¯)βd .
Therefore
Kc,1 =
( αcAc
pnαdAd
) 1
1−αc
K
1−αd
1−αc
d,1
(
Ld,1 − L¯
) −βd
1−αc
=
(αcAc
αd
) 1
1−αc
( 1
pnAd
) 1
αd(1−αc)
(w1
βd
) 1−αd
αd(1−αc) (Ld,1 − L¯) 1−αd−βdαd(1−αc) .
According Kc,1 + Kd,1 =
S
p
, we get that w1 is a solution of the equation
G2(x) = 0, where
G2(x) := −S
p
+
( x
βdpnAd
) 1
αd
(
L0 + T0 − L¯− σex
−(1−αe)
1−αe−βe
) 1−βd
αd (25)
+
(αcAc
αd
) 1
1−αc
( 1
pnAd
) 1
αd(1−αc)
( x
βd
) 1−αd
αd(1−αc)
(
L0 + T0 − L¯− σex
−(1−αe)
1−αe−βe
) 1−αd−βd
αd(1−αc) .
It is easy to see that the function G2 is increasing. Moreover, inf
x
G2(x) = −S
p
and sup
x
G2(x) = +∞. Therefore, the equation G2(x) = 0 has the unique
solution, called w1.
By observing the equation G2(w1) = 0, we see that when Ad tends to infinity
then w1(Ad) tends to infinity.
FOCs give us βdpnYd,1 = w1(Ad)(Ld,1(Ad) − L¯) = w1(Ad)(L0 + T0 − L¯ −
σew
−(1−αe)
1−αe−βe
1 ). Consequently, lim
Ad→+∞
pnYd,1 = +∞, then the welfare in this case
is greater than the welfare in the first case, which does not depend on Ad.
Moreover, lim
Ad→+∞
Yd,1 = +∞ implies that Yd,1 > Ye,1 with Ad is high enough.
It means that we have just proved the result mentioned in Proposition 7.
Remark 2. Assume that L0 + T0 > L¯ and  is low enough such that βdS <
αd(L0 + T0 − L¯). When Ad is high enough then the list
(Kc,1, Kd,1, Ld,1, Le,1, Ke,1, w1)
given in case 2 above is the unique equilibrium.
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Proof. Indeed, labor market clearing condition is satisfied. All FOCs of the
foreign firm hold. It remains to justify the FOC with respect to variable
H1 = 0, which is λ ≥ w1, i.e., pw1K1−αcc,1 ≤ αcAc. We have
w1K
1−αc
c,1
αcAc
=
w1
αd
( 1
pnAd
) 1
αd
(w1
βd
) 1−αd
αd
(
L0 + T0 − L¯− σew
−(1−αe)
1−αe−βe
1
) 1−αd−βd
αd .
Since G2(w1(Ad)) = 0 and lim
Ad→+∞
w1(Ad) = +∞, we have
S
p
≥ ( 1
βdpn
) 1
αd (L0 + T0 − L¯)
1−βd
αd
(
lim sup
Ad→+∞
w1(Ad)
Ad
) 1
αd
Hence, lim sup
Ad→+∞
w1(Ad)
Ad
< +∞ then lim
Ad→+∞
(w1(Ad))
1−αd
Ad
= 0. Again, by
using lim
Ad→+∞
G2(w1(Ad)) = 0 which implies that
S
p
=
( 1
βdpn
) 1
αd (L0 + T0 − L¯)
1−βd
αd lim
Ad→+∞
(w1(Ad)
Ad
) 1
αd . (26)
We now assume that βdS < αd(L0 + T0 − L¯). We have
lim
Ad→+∞
p
w1K
1−αc
c,1
αcAc
= p lim
Ad→+∞
(w1(Ad)
Ad
) 1
αd
( 1
pn
) 1
αd 1
αdβ
1−αd
αd
d
(
L0 + T0 − L¯
) 1−αd−βd
αd
=
βdS
αd(L0 + T0 − L¯) < 1.
Consequently, if Ad is high enough then pw1K
1−αc
c,1 ≤ αcAc, i.e., FOC of H1
is satisfied.
When Ad tends to infinity then the welfare tends to infinity.
5.2 Equilibrium with H1 > 0
Let denote L0 := L0 + T0 + S and U˜ (resp. Uˆ) the GNP in case Yd,1 > 0
(resp. Yd,1 = 0).
Recall that we are considering equilibrium with H1 > 0, so λh = 0.
We will consider 2 cases: Yd,1 > 0 and Yd,1 = 0. Let denote U˜ and Uˆ the
welfare value of problem (P ) with Yd,1 > 0 and with Yd,1 = 0, respectively.
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Case 1. Assume that (K˜c,1, K˜d,1, H˜1, L˜d,1, K˜e,1L˜e,1, w˜1) with L˜d,1 > L¯,
K˜d,1 > 0 is an equilibrium. We have
H˜1 : −λ+ µ = 0
L˜d,1 : pnβdAdK˜
αd
d,1(L˜d,1 − L¯)βd−1 − µ = 0
K˜d,1 : pnαdAdK˜
αd−1
d,1 (L˜d,1 − L¯)βd − λp = 0.
We get that
K˜c,1 =
[αcAc
pw˜1
] 1
1−αc
(27)
L˜d,1 − L¯ = βd
αd
pK˜d,1, K˜d,1 =
[pnαdAd
pw˜1
(
βdp
αd
)βd
] 1
1−αd−βd . (28)
By combining the budget constraint of the social planner and labor market
clearing condition, we imply that(
(L˜d,1 − L¯) + pK˜d,1
)
+ pK˜c,1 + L˜e,1 = S + L0 + T0 − L¯.
It means that w˜1 is a solution of the equation G(x) = 0, where we define
G(x) := σcx
−1
1−αc + σex
−(1−αe)
1−αe−βe + σdx
−1
1−αd−βd
−(S + L0 + T0 − L¯) (29)
σc := (αcAc)
1
1−αc
(
p
) −αc
1−αc (30)
σd := (αd + βd)α
αd
1−αd−βd
d β
βd
1−αd−βd
d
(
Adpn
) 1
1−αd−βd
(
p
) −αd
1−αd−βd . (31)
We see that lim
w˜1→0+
G(w˜1) = +∞, lim
w˜1→+∞
G(w˜1) = L¯−L0 and G′(w˜1) < 0 for
every w˜1 ∈ (0,+∞). Therefore if L¯−L0 < 0 then the equation (29) has the
unique solution in (0,+∞).
Condition H1 > 0 is equivalent to
S
p
>
[αcAc
pw˜1
] 1
1−αc
+
[pnαdAd
pw˜1
(
βdp
αd
)βd
] 1
1−αd−βd .
This condition can be rewritten as follows
S > σcw˜
−1
1−αc
1 +
αd
αd + βd
σdw˜
−1
1−αd−βd
1 . (32)
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We now compute the welfare in this case. The welfare is given by
U˜ = F c(K˜c,1) + w˜1L˜e,1 + pnF
d(K˜d,1, L˜d,1)
= Ac
[αcAc
pw˜1
] αc
1−αc
+ w˜1σew˜
−(1−αe)
1−αe−βe
1
+
p
αd
[
(
βdp
αd
)βd(
αdAdpn
p
)
1
1−αd−βd
][ 1
w˜1
] αd+βd
1−αd−βd
= γcw˜
−αc
1−αc
1 + γew˜
−βe
1−αe−βe
1 + γdw˜
−αd−βd
1−αd−βd
1 ,
where, we define
γc :=
σc
αc
, γd :=
σd
αd + βd
, γe := σe.
Case 2. Assume that (Kˆc,1, Kˆd,1, Hˆ1, Lˆd,1, Kˆe,1Lˆe,1, wˆ1) with Lˆd,1 = Kˆd,1 =
0 is an equilibrium. In this case, we note that Lˆe,1 + pKˆc,1 = L0. As in the
case 1, we have
Kˆc,1 =
[αcAc
pwˆ1
] 1
1−αc
Kˆe,1 =
αe
βe
wˆ1
pn
Lˆe,1, Lˆe,1 = σewˆ
−(1−αe)
1−αe−βe
1 .
We get that wˆ1 is a solution of the following equation
Q(wˆ1) := σcwˆ
−1
1−αc
1 + σewˆ
−(1−αe)
1−αe−βe
1 − L0 = 0 (33)
We see that lim
wˆ1→0+
Q(wˆ1) = +∞, lim
wˆ1→+∞
Q(wˆ1) = −L0 and G′(wˆ1) < 0 for
every wˆ1 ∈ (0,+∞). Therefore the equation (33) has the unique solution in
(0,+∞). This solution is denoted by wˆ1.
We now compute the welfare. The welfare is given by
Uˆ = F c(Kˆc,1) + wˆ1Lˆe,1 = Ac
[αcAc
pwˆ1
] αc
1−αc
+ wˆ1σewˆ
−(1−αe)
1−αe−βe
1
= γc(wˆ1)
−αc
1−αc + γe(wˆ1)
−βe
1−αe−βe .
Condition H1 > 0 is equivalent to
S
p
>
[αcAc
pwˆ1
] 1
1−αc
, i.e., S > σcwˆ
−1
1−αc
1 ..
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Lemma 1. If (1− αd − βd)γdw˜
−αd−βd
1−αd−βd
1 ≥ w˜1L¯ then U˜ > Uˆ .
This result means that if the potential domestic firm’s profit (1 − αd −
βd)pnYd,1 can cover the value of the entry costs w˜1L¯, the country should
invest in the new industry.
Proof. We observe that
Uˆ =
(
S + L0 + T0 + (1− αc)γcwˆ
−1
1−αc
1
)
wˆ1 (34)
U˜ =
(
S + L0 + T0 − L¯+ (1− αc)γcw˜
−1
1−αc
1
+(1− αd − βd)γdw˜
−1
1−αd−β−d
1
)
w˜1. (35)
Therefore, we get
U˜ − Uˆ = (S + L0 + T0)(w˜1 − wˆ1) + (1− αc)γc(w˜
−αc
1−αc
1 − wˆ
−αc
1−αc
1 )
+
(1− αd − βd
αd + βd
σdw˜
−1
1−αd−βd
1 − L¯
)
w˜1. (36)
Consider the function f(x) := (S + L0 + T0)x +
1−αc
αc
σcw˜
−αc
1−αc
1 . We have
f ′(x) > 0 for every x such that S + L0 + T0 > σcx
−1
1−αc . Therefore, w˜1 > wˆ1
implies that f(w˜1) > f(wˆ1), i.e.,
U˜ − Uˆ > (1− αd − βd
αd + βd
σdw˜
−1
1−αd−βd
1 − L¯
)
w˜1.
5.3 Formal proofs
Proof of Proposition 2. The first statement is clear. We will prove the
second one. It is trivial if H1 = 0. Hence, we assume that H1 > 0. We
consider 2 cases: Yd,1 = 0 and Yd,1 > 0.
Case 1: Yd,1 = 0. It is easy to see that when T0 increases, wˆ1 decreases.
Therefore pKc,1
S
= σc
S
wˆ
−1
1−αc
1 will increases which implies θh decreases.
The same argument can be used to prove our result in the case Yd,1 > 0.
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Proof of Proposition 3. Point (i): We consider two cases H1 > 0 and
H1 = 0.
Case 1: H1 > 0. Let L¯ → 0, we have lim
L¯→0
wˆ1(L¯) = wˆ1, lim
L¯→0
w˜1(L¯) = w˜1,
where wˆ1, w˜1 such that
σcwˆ
−1
1−αc
1 + σewˆ
−(1−αe)
1−αe−βe
1 = S + L0 + T0 (37)
σcw˜
−1
1−αc
1 + σew˜
−(1−αe)
1−αe−βe
1 + σdw˜
−1
1−αd−βd
1 = S + L0 + T0. (38)
We also have lim
L¯→0
U˜(L¯) = U˜ , lim
L¯→0
Uˆ(L¯) = Uˆ , and
U˜ − Uˆ = (S + L0 + T0)w˜1 − (S + L0 + T0)wˆ1 (39)
+(1− αc)γc(w˜
−αc
1−αc
1 − wˆ
−αc
1−αc
1 ) + (1− αd − βd)γdw˜
−αd−βd
1−αd−β−d
1 .
Consider the function f(x) := (S + L0 + T0)x +
1−αc
αc
σcw˜
−αc
1−αc
1 . We have
f ′(x) > 0 for every x such that S + L0 + T0 > σcx
−1
1−αc . Therefore, w˜1 > wˆ1
implies that f(w˜1) > f(wˆ1), i.e., U˜−Uˆ > 0. Since U˜(L¯)−Uˆ(L¯) is continuous,
there exists L¯∗ > 0 such that U˜(L¯) > Uˆ(L¯) for every L¯ ≥ L¯∗.
Case 2: When H1 = 0. It is clear.
Point (ii): It is easy to see that lim
S→+∞
wˆ = lim
S→+∞
w˜ = 0. Therefore, for
S is high enough, we have (1−αd−βd)γdw˜
−αd−βd
1−αd−βd
1 > L¯w˜1. Consequently, we
obtain
U˜(S)− Uˆ(S) > (S + L0 + T0)(w˜1 − wˆ1) + 1− αc
αc
σc(w˜
−αc
1−αc
1 − wˆ
−αc
1−αc
1 ).
By using the same argument in the proof of point (i), we have U˜(S)−Uˆ(S) >
0 for S high enough.
Proof of Proposition 4. Point (i): Let Ae tend to infinity, we have γe
and so wˆ1, w˜1 will tend to infinity. Consequently, we have
lim
Ae→+∞
γewˆ
−(1−αe)
1−αe−βe
1 = S + L0 + T0 (40)
lim
Ae→+∞
γew˜
−(1−αe)
1−αe−βe
1 = S + L0 + T0 − L¯ (41)
lim
Ae→+∞
( w˜
wˆ1
) 1−αe
1−αe−βe
=
S + L0 + T0
S + L0 + T0 − L¯ > 1. (42)
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Therefore, we get that
lim
Ae→+∞
U˜
Uˆ
=
( w˜
wˆ1
) −βe
1−αe−βe
< 1. (43)
Thus, there exists Ae > 0 such that Uˆ > U˜ , i.e., Yd,1 = 0. It remains to
verify that H1 > 0, i.e., wˆ1 >
αcAc
pαcS1−αc . This condition is satisfied if Ae is
high enough.
Point (ii): Assume that H1 > 0. Like proof of Proposition 4, we have
Yd,1 = 0. But in this case, condition H1 > 0 is not satisfied. Hence, we have
H1 = 0 at equilibrium.
By using the similar argument in Remark 2, we get that Yd,1 = 0 and
FOC with respect to H1 is satisfied.
Proof of Proposition 6. Assume that L0 > L¯ ≥ L0 +T0. The wage w˜1 is
the unique solution of the following equation
σcw˜
−1
1−αc
1 + σew˜
−(1−αe)
1−αe−βe
1 + σdw˜
−1
1−αd−βd
1 = S + L0 + T0 − L¯. (44)
We see that w˜1 depends on Ad, we can write w˜1 = w˜1(Ad). It is easy to see
that w˜1(·) is increasing in (0,+∞). Since lim
Ad→∞
σd = +∞ and σdw˜
−1
1−αd−βd
1 <
L0 − L¯, we obtain lim
Ad→+∞
w˜1(Ad) = +∞. By combining with (44), we have
lim
Ad→+∞
σdw˜
−1
1−αd−βd
1 = L0 − L¯ > 0.
Consequently, we obtain
lim
Ad→+∞
σdw˜
−αd−βd
1−αd−βd
1 = lim
Ad→+∞
σ1−αd−βdd
[
σdw˜
−1
1−αd−βd
1
]αd+βd
= (L0 − L¯)αd+βd lim
Ad→+∞
σ1−αd−βdd = +∞.
Therefore lim
Ad→+∞
U˜(Ad) = +∞. By combining with wˆ1 does not depend on
Ad, we have lim
Ad→+∞
U˜(Ad) > Uˆ, then critical level A¯1 in Proposition 6 exists.
Since L¯ ≥ L0 + T0, we have
S ≥ L0 − L¯ = σcw˜
−1
1−αc
1 + σew˜
−(1−αe)
1−αe−βe
1 + σdw˜
−1
1−αd−βd
1 (45)
> σcw˜
−1
1−αc
1 +
αd
αd + βd
σdw˜
−1
1−αd−βd
1 . (46)
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Therefore, we have H1 > 0. We can now define A¯1 and A˜1 .
A¯1 := inf{Ad : U˜(Ad) ≥ Uˆ} (47)
A˜1 := inf{Ad : Yd,1 ≥ Ye,1}. (48)
We now prove that A¯1 increases if L¯ increases.
For each L¯, Ad, we write w˜1(L¯, Ad) meaning that wage depends on L¯, Ad.
Then A¯1 is the unique level of productivity such that U˜(A¯1) = Uˆ which can
be rewritten as
γc
(
w˜1(L¯, A¯1)
) −αc
1−αc + γe
(
w˜1(L¯, A¯1)
) −βe
1−αe−βe + γd
(
w˜1(L¯, A¯1)
) −αd−βd
1−αd−βd = Uˆ .
Note that Uˆ does depend neither on L¯ nor on Ad. Since w˜1 is increasing in
the first variable, decreasing in the second variable, and γd is increasing in
Ad then we have A¯1 is increasing in L¯.
Similarly, A˜1 is increasing in L¯.
Proof of Proposition 7. Case 1: S <
αd
βd
(L0 + T0 − L¯). This case is a
direct consequence of Remark 2.
A¯2, A˜2 can be defined as follows
A¯2 := inf{Ad : U˜(Ad) ≥ Uˆ and pK1−αcc,1 ≤ αcAc} (49)
A˜2 := inf{Ad ≥ A¯2 : Yd,1 ≥ Ye,1}, (50)
where Kc,1 is defined as in the case 2 of Appendix B.
Case 2: S >
αd
βd
(L0 + T0 − L¯). We get
S > (S + L0 + T0 − L¯) αd
αd + βd
.
Condition H1 > 0 is equivalent to S > p(Kc,1 +Kd,1), i.e.,
S > σcw˜
−1
1−αc
1 +
αd
αd + βd
σdw˜
−1
1−αd−βd
1 .
As in Proposition 6, we have lim
Ad→+∞
σdw˜
−1
1−αd−βd
1 = S + L0 + T0 − L¯ > 0.
Thus
lim
Ad→+∞
σcw˜
−1
1−αc
1 +
αd
αd + βd
σdw˜
−1
1−αd−βd
1 =
αd
αd + βd
(S + L0 + T0 − L¯) < S.
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This implies that H1 > 0 if Ad is high enough. Other statements in this case
are proved in Proposition 6.
A¯3 can be defined as follows
A¯3 := inf{Ad : U˜(Ad) ≥ Uˆ and
S > σcw˜
−1
1−αc
1 +
αd
αd + βd
σdw˜
−1
1−αd−βd
1 } (51)
A˜3 := inf{Ad ≥ A¯3 : Yd,1 ≥ Ye,1}. (52)
Proof of Proposition 8 . We have H1 = S−p(Kc,1+Kd,1). Hence H1 > 0
if and only if
S
p
> Kc,1 +Kd,1. (53)
If Yd,1 = 0. In this case, (53) is equivalent to S > σcwˆ
−1
1−αc
1 . Recall that wˆ1
is the unique solution of the following equation
Q(wˆ1) := σcwˆ
−1
1−αc
1 + σewˆ
−(1−αe)
1−αe−βe
1 − (S + L0 + T0) = 0.
Consequently, H1 > 0 if and only if σewˆ
−(1−αe)
1−αe−βe
1 > L0 + T0. Since wˆ1 is
decreasing in , this condition is equivalent to  > 1, where 1 is the unique
solution of the equation σex
−(1−αe)
1−αe−βe = L0 + T0.
If Yd,1 > 0. In this case, (53) is equivalent to
γew˜
−(1−αe)
1−αe−βe
1 + αdγdw˜
−1
1−αd−βd
1 > L0 + T0 − L¯. (54)
Since γd is decreasing and w˜1 is increasing in , condition (54) is equivalent
to  > 2, where 1 is the unique solution of the equation
γew˜
−(1−αe)
1−αe−βe
1 + αdγdw˜
−1
1−αd−βd
1 = L0 + T0 − L¯.
Therefore, H1 > 0 if  > ¯ := max{1, 2}; H1 = 0 if  <  := min{1, 2}.
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Proof of Proposition 9. We denote Xc, Xd, Xe such that
σc = Xc
−αc
1−αc , σd = Xd
−αd
1−αd−βd , σe = Xe.
Note that Xc, Xd, Xe do not depend on .
By definition of wˆ1, we have
Xc
(wˆ1)
1
1−αc
+
Xe
wˆ
1−αe
1−αe−βe
1
= S +
L0 + T0

. (55)
Let  tend to infinity, thus the wage wˆ1() which is a function of  will tend
to zero. Moreover, we have lim
→+∞
wˆ1() = +∞. Indeed, (55) implies that
lim inf
→+∞
wˆ
1−αe
1−αe−βe
1 ≥
Xe
S
. Therefore
wˆ1 = wˆ
1−αe
1−αe−βe
1 wˆ
−βe
1−αe−βe
1 → +∞ when → +∞.
By combining with (55), we obtain lim
→+∞
Xe
wˆ
1−αe
1−αe−βe
1
= S.
Definition of w˜1 implies that
Xc
(w˜1)
1
1−αc
+
Xe
w˜
1−αe
1−αe−βe
1
+
Xd
(w˜
1
1−βd
1 )
1−βd
1−αd−βd
= S +
L0 + T0 − L¯

. (56)
By the same argument, we obtain lim
→+∞
w˜1() = 0 and lim
→+∞
w˜1() = +∞.
We now compare the welfare between two cases: Yd,1 > 0 and Yd,1 = 0 by
observing the difference U˜ − Uˆ .
Case 1: 1− αd > βe1−αe , i.e., 1αd − 1−αe1−αe−βe > 0.
According to Lemma 1, we have
U˜ − Uˆ ≥ (1− αd − βd
αd + βd
σdw˜
−1
1−αd−βd
1 − L¯
)
w˜1. (57)
We will prove that lim
→∞
σdw˜
−1
1−αd−βd
1 = +∞, and then obtain that U˜ − Uˆ > 0
when  is high enough.
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If βd ≤ βe1−αe , i.e., 11−βd ≤ 1−αe1−αe−βe . By using the same argument as in the
begining of proof of this proposition, we have that there exists lim
→∞
w˜
1−αe
1−αe−βe
1 <
∞. Hence, we get that
w˜
1
αd
1 = w˜
1−αe
1−αe−βe
1 w˜
1
αd
− 1−αe
1−αe−βe
1 → 0
when  → ∞. Consequently, lim
→∞
σdw˜
−1
1−αd−βd
1 = lim
→∞
Xd
(
w˜
1
αd
1
) −αd
1−αd−βd =
+∞.
If βd >
βe
1−αe , i.e.,
1
1−βd >
1−αe
1−αe−βe . In this case, we have that there exists
lim
→∞
w˜
1
1−βd
1 <∞. Therefore, by noting that 1− βd > αd, we obtain
w˜
1
αd
1 = w˜
1
1−βd
1 w˜
1
αd
− 1
1−βd
1 → 0
when →∞. Consequently, we get lim
→∞
σdw˜
−1
1−αd−βd
1 =∞.
Case 2: 1−αd < βe1−αe . In this case, we have 1−αe1−αe−βe > 1αd > 11−βd . As a
consequence, we have lim
→∞
w˜
1−αe
1−αe−βe
1 =
Xe
S
. By combining with the fact that
lim
→∞
w˜1 = 0, we have
w˜
1
αd
1 = w˜
1−αe
1−αe−βe
1 w˜
1
αd
− 1−αe
1−αe−βe
1 →∞
when →∞. Therefore, we obtain lim
→∞
σdw˜
−1
1−αd−βd
1 = 0.
First, we have a remark that for γ ∈ (0, 1), we have yγ−zγ > γyγ−1(y−z)
for every y, z > 0. Therefore, we have
wˆ
−αc
1−αc
1 − w˜
−αc
1−αc
1 = (wˆ
−1
1−αc
1 )
αc − (w˜
−1
1−αc
1 )
αc ≥ αcwˆ1(wˆ
−1
1−αc
1 − w˜
−1
1−αc
1 )
wˆ
−βe
1−αe−βe
1 − w˜
−βe
1−αe−βe
1 = (wˆ
−(1−αe)
1−αe−βe
1 )
βe
1−αe − (w˜
−(1−αe)
1−αe−βe
1 )
βe
1−αe
≥ βe
1− αe wˆ1(wˆ
−(1−αe)
1−αe−βe
1 − w˜
−(1−αe)
1−αe−βe
1 ).
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We now write
Uˆ − U˜ = γc(wˆ
−αc
1−αc
1 − w˜
−αc
1−αc
1 ) + γe(wˆ
−βe
1−αe−βe
1 − w˜
−βe
1−αe−βe
1 )− γdw˜
−αd−βd
1−αd−βd
1
=
βe
1− αe
(
(
1− αe
βe
− 1)σc
αc
(wˆ
−αc
1−αc
1 − w˜
−αc
1−αc
1 ) +
σc
αc
(wˆ
−αc
1−αc
1 − w˜
−αc
1−αc
1 )
)
+
βe
1− αe
1− αe
βe
γe(wˆ
−βe
1−αe−βe
1 − w˜
−βe
1−αe−βe
1 )− γdw˜
−αd−βd
1−αd−βd
1
≥ 1− αe − βe
1− αe
σc
αc
(wˆ
−αc
1−αc
1 − w˜
−αc
1−αc
1 )− γdw˜
−αd−βd
1−αd−βd
1
+
βe
1− αe wˆ1
(
σc(wˆ
−1
1−αc
1 − w˜
−1
1−αc
1 ) + σe(wˆ
−(1−αe)
1−αe−βe
1 − wˆ
−(1−αe)
1−αe−βe
1 )
)
>
βe
1− αe wˆ1(L¯− σdw˜
−1
1−αd−βd
1 )− γdw˜
−αd−βd
1−αd−βd
1 .
Therefore, we have
Uˆ − U˜ > wˆ1
( βe
1− αe L¯−
βe
1− αeσdw˜
−1
1−αd−βd
1 −
w˜1
(αd + βd)wˆ1
σdw˜
−1
1−αd−βd
1
)
.
Recall that in this case, we have L¯ > 0, lim
→∞
w˜1
wˆ1
= 1 and lim
→∞
σdw˜
−1
1−αd−βd
1 = 0.
So, we imply that Uˆ − U˜ > 0 when  is high enough.
Proof of Proposition 11. If S+L0 +T0 ≤ L¯, we have Yd,1 = 0. We now
consider the case S + L0 + T0 > L¯.
We assume that H1 > 0. By observing equation determining wage, we see
that wage increases when the new good price increases. Moreover, lim
pn→+∞
w˜1 =
lim
pn→+∞
wˆ1 = +∞. (33) implies that
lim
pn→+∞
σewˆ
− 1−αe
1−αe−βe
1 = S + L0 + T0.
Equation determining w˜ is equivalent to
σcw˜
−1
1−αc
1 +
σe
p
1
1−αe−βe
n
( pn
w˜1−αe1
) 1
1−αe−βe +
σe
p
1
1−αd−βd
n
( pn
w˜1
) 1
1−αd−βd = S+L0 +T0−L¯,
where we note that σe
p
1
1−αe−βe
n
and σe
p
1
1−αd−βd
n
do not depend on pn.
Therefore, we have pn
w˜1
w˜αe = pn
w˜1−αe1
is bounded. This implies that lim
pn→+∞
pn
w˜1
=
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0. Consequently, we get
lim
pn→+∞
σew˜
− 1−αe
1−αe−βe
1 = S + L0 + T0 − L¯.
Thus, we obtain lim
pn→+∞
wˆ1
w˜1
=
( S + L0 + T0
S + L0 + T0 − L¯
)− 1−αe−βe
1−αe .
We now compare welfares
Uˆ
U˜
=
γc(wˆ1)
−αc
1−αc + γe(wˆ1)
−βe
1−αe−βe
γcw˜
−αc
1−αc
1 + γew˜
−βe
1−αe−βe
1 + γdw˜
−αd−βd
1−αd−βd
1
=
γc(wˆ1)
−1
1−αc + γe(wˆ1)
−(1−αe)
1−αe−βe
γcw˜
−1
1−αc
1 + γew˜
−(1−αe)
1−αe−βe
1 + γdw˜
−1
1−αd−βd
1
wˆ1
w˜1
Hence, we obtain
lim
pn→+∞
Uˆ
U˜
=
( S + L0 + T0
S + L0 + T0 − L¯
) βe
1−αe > 1.
This implies that when pn is high enough, Uˆ > U˜ .
We can also see that condition (53) is satisfied when pn is high enough. So,
when pn is high enough, we have Yd,1 = 0 and H1 > 0 at equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 12. Case (i): αe
1−αe > max(αc, αd). As in proof of
Proposition 11, we obtain
lim
p→0
wˆ1p
αc = lim
p→0
w˜1p
αc = lim
p→0
w˜1p
αd = +∞
lim
p→0
σewˆ
− 1−αe
1−αe−βe
w = S + L0 + T0
lim
p→0
σewˆ
− 1−αe
1−αe−βe
w = S + L0 + T0 − L¯.
Consequently, we get
lim
p→0
wˆ1
w˜1
=
( S + L0 + T0
S + L0 + T0 − L¯
)− 1−αe−βe
1−αe (58)
lim
p→0
Uˆ
U˜
=
( S + L0 + T0
S + L0 + T0 − L¯
) βe
1−αe . (59)
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Therefore, when p is low enough, we have Uˆ1 > U˜ .
We have to now check that H1 > 0 when p is low enough. We will check that
S > σcwˆ
−1
1−αc
1 . As in proof of Proposition 11, we obtain lim
p→0
σcwˆ
−1
1−αc
1 = 0.
Hence, H1 > 0 when p is low enough.
Case (ii.a): The proof is similar to point (ii) of Proposition 3.
Case (ii.b): Assume that H1 = 0, we write the equation of w1
S =
( 1
βdpnAd
) 1
αd (pw
1
αd
1 )
(
L0 + T0 − L¯− Me
(pw
1−αe
αe
1 )
αe
1−αe−βe
) 1−βd
αd
+
(αcAc
αd
) 1
1−αc
( 1
pnAdβ
1−αd
d
) 1
αd(1−αc)pw
1−αd
αd(1−αc)
1
(
L0 + T0
−L¯− Me
(pw
1−αe
αe
1 )
αe
1−αe−βe
) 1−αd−βd
αd(1−αc) ,
where Me := σep
αe
1−αe−βe which does not depend on p.
First, it is easy to see that w1 increases if p decreases. Moreover, lim
p→0
w1(p) =
+∞.
If there is a sequence (p(n))n=1,2,..., converging to zero such that p(n)
(
w1(n)
) 1−αe
αe
is bounded from above.13 Since 1−αd
αd(1−αc) <
1
αd
< 1−αe
αe
, We have
p(n)
(
w1(n)
) 1
αd = p(n)
(
w1(n)
) 1−αe
αe
(
w1(n)
) 1
αd
− 1−αe
αe → 0 when n→ 0
p(n)
(
w1(n)
) 1−αd
αd(1−αc) = p(n)
(
w1(n)
) 1
αd
(
w1(n)
) 1−αd
αd(1−αc)
− 1
αd → 0 when n→ 0.
Therefore, we get a contradiction to the equation of w1. So, we have lim
p→0
p
(
w1(p)
) 1−αe
αe =
+∞.
We now prove that lim
p→0
p
(
w1(p)
) 1−αd
αd(1−αc) = 0. Indeed, if there is a sequence
(p(n))n=1,2,... converging to zero such that p(n)
(
w1(n)
) 1−αd
αd(1−αc) is bounded
from below. We get that
p(n)
(
w1(n)
) 1
αd = p(n)
(
w1(n)
) 1−αd
αd(1−αc)
(
w1(n)
) 1
αd
− 1−αd
αd(1−αc) → +∞
when n tends to infinite. This implies a contradiction to to the equation
determining wage.
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We have proved that lim
p→0
p
(
w1(p)
) 1−αe
αe = +∞ and lim
p→0
p
(
w1(p)
) 1−αd
αd(1−αc) = 0.
The equation determining wage implies that
S =
( 1
βdpnAd
) 1
αd (L0 + T0 − L¯)
1−βd
αd lim
p→0
pw
1
αd
1 . (60)
By using the same argument in Remark 2, we see that the first order condition
of H1 is satisfied.
Proof of Example 1. We prove point (i). Point (ii) can be proved by the
same argument.
Assume that there exists an equilibrium with H1, Yd,1 > 0.
We find conditions in which U˜ ≥ Uˆ under Assumption 9.
By using Assumption 9, we have
w˜x1 =
L0 − L¯
σc + σe + σd
U˜ = (γc + γe + γd)w˜
x+1
1
(wˆ1)
x =
L0
σc + σe
Uˆ = (γc + γe)(wˆ1)
x+1,
where x := −1/(1− αc). Therefore we see that
U˜ ≥ Uˆ ⇔ γc + γe + γd
γc + γe
≥
( L0
L0 − L¯
σc + σe + σd
σc + σe
)αc
⇔ L0 − L¯ ≥ ΩL0 ⇔ (1− Ω)L0 ≥ L¯.
Note that Ω < 1. Indeed,
Ω :=
α(γc + γd) + γe
αγc + γe
( γc + γe
γc + γe + γd
) 1
αc
<
α(γc + γd) + γe
αγc + γe
γc + γe
γc + γe + γd
.
On the other hand,
α(γc + γd) + γe
αγc + γe
= 1 +
αγd
αγc + γe
< 1 +
γd
γc + γe
=
γc + γe + γd
γc + γe
.
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Therefore Ω < 1. Consequently, U˜ ≥ Uˆ if and only if L0 ≥ L¯
1− Ω .
Condition H1 > 0 is equivalent to
S > σcw˜
−1
1−αc
1 +
αd
αd + βd
σdw˜
−1
1−αd−βd
1 .
Under Assumption 3, we have wˆ
1
1−αc = wˆ
1
1−αd−βd =
S + L0 + T0 − L¯
σc + σd + σe
. There-
fore, H1 is equivalent to condition (11).
We now assume that condition (10) and (11) hold. Then S+L0+T0−L¯ >
0 then equation (29) has a unique solution who is equilibrium wage. We see
that all first order conditions hold. Condition (11) ensures that H1 > 0 in
this case. Thus, the list (Kc,1, Kd,1, H1, Ld,1, Le,1, Ke,1, w1) given in proof of
Example 1 in case Yd,1 > 0 is the unique equilibrium.
6 Appendix: Constant return to scale
We assume that αd+βd = αe+βe = 1. In order to present formal proofs of our
results with CRS technologies, let us begin by some necessary computations.
We write FOC for the multinational firm. If Ke,1, Le,1 > 0, we have
αepnAeK
αe−1
e,1 L
1−αe
e,1 = p (61)
(1− αe)pnAeKαee,1Lαee,1 = w1. (62)
Consequently, we get w1−αe1 = α
αe
e (1 − αe)1−αeAepnp−αe . In this case, the
multinational firm’s profit equals zero. This implies that the multinational
firm’s profit equals zero in any case. Note that Ke,1 = Le,1 = 0 is a solution
of this firm’s maximization problem.
Denote λh, λ` Lagrange multipliers associated to conditions (4), (5), H1 ≥
0, and Le,1 ≥ 0, respectively. We have
Kc,1 : αcAcK
αc−1
c,1 = λp
Le,1 : w1 − µ+ λ` = 0, where λ` ≥ 0, Le,1λ` = 0.
H1 : −λ+ µ+ λh = 0, where λh ≥ 0, H1λh = 0.
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If Yd,1 > 0, we have
Kd,1 : pnαdAdK
αd−1
d,1 (Ld,1 − L¯)1−αd = λp
Ld,1 : pn(1− αd)AdKαdd,1(Ld,1 − L¯)−αd = µ.
Proof of Theorem 2. The first case is clear. We assume that L0+T0+S >
L¯. It is easy to see that when Ad tends to infinity, the GNP tend to infinity if
the host country invest in the new industry. So, when Ad is high enough, we
have Yd,1 > 0 at equilibrium. Therefore, L0 + T0 + H1 > L¯ at equilibrium.
If L0 + T0 ≤ L¯ then we have H1 > 0. The second statement of Theorem 2 is
proved.
Case (2.2.1) L0 + T0 > L¯ and S <
αd
1−αd (L0 + T0 − L¯). Assume that
Le,1 = H1 = 0. FOCs of Kc,1 and Kd,1 imply that
αcAcK
1−αd
d,1 (L0 + T0 − L¯)−(1−αd) = pnαdAdK1−αcc,1 .
We then get an equation determining Kc,1
S = pKc,1 +
(pnαcAc
αdAd
) 1
1−αd (L0 + T0 − L¯)K
1−αc
1−αd
c,1 .
This equation has a unique solution. It is easy to see that when Ad increases,
Kc,1 decreases, and lim
Ad→+∞
Kc,1 = 0, lim
Ad→+∞
Kd,1 = S/p.
We now check FOC of H1: λ ≥ µ will be satisfied when Ad is high
enough. This condition can be written as λp
µ
≥ p which is equivalent to
αd
1−αd
Ld,1−L¯
Kd,1
≥ p. This condition is satisfied when Ad is high enough since
lim
Ad→+∞
Kd,1 = S/p.
Case (2.2.2) L0 + T0 > L¯ and S >
αd
1−αd (L0 + T0 − L¯). We will check
that Le,0 = 0 and H1 > 0 at equilibrium. Assume that Le,1 = 0 and H1 > 0.
Then we have Ld,1 = L0 + T0 + H1 and λ = µ. FOCs of Kd,1, Ld,1 implies
that
Ld,1−L¯
Kd,1
= 1−αd
αd
p. Hence, we get pKd,1 =
αd
1−αd (L0 + T0 + H1 − L¯) and
αcAcK
αc−1
c,1 = λp = pnαdAdK
αd−1
d,1 (Ld,1 − L¯)1−αd = pnαdAd
(1− αd
αd
p
)1−αd .
Hence, we can compute Kc,1 in oder to get that
S = pKc,1 + pKd,1 +H1
=
( αcAc
pnαdAd
) 1
1−αc
( αd
(1− αd)
) 1−αd
1−αc p
αd−αc
1−αc +
H1
1− αd +
αd(L0 + T0 − L¯)
1− αd) .
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Since S > αd(L0+T0−L¯)
1−αd) , this equation has a unique solution H1 > 0 when Ad
is high enough. It is easy to check all FOCs. Therefore, Le,1 = 0, Yd,1, H1 > 0
given as above is an equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 10. When  is high enough, it is clear that the coun-
try should invest in training.
Assume that the country also invests in the new industry, i.e., Yd,1 > 0.
According the computation in the proof of Theorem 2, we have
αcAc ≥ pnαdAd
(1− αd
αd
p
)1−αdK1−αcc,1 ≥ pnαdAd(1− αdαd p)1−αd(Sp )1−αc .
This condition will be violated when  is high enough.
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